A diplomatic history of the American people by Bailey Thomas Andrew 1902-

Author:Bailey, Thomas Andrew, 1902-
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: United States -- Foreign relations.
Publisher: Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall
Published: 1980-03-14T16:00:00+00:00

Largely as a result of strong political pressure from the White House, the two "scuttle resolutions" were disposed of, in March, 1916. The New York Herald rejoiced: "Pro-Germans a're Swept to Defeat as the House Votes to Sustain American Rights." Yet American men, women, and children continued to embark on contraband-laden British liners, some of them armed, for submarine-infested waters. Whatever their rights, these people were just as dead, when killed, as if they had been wrong. And the consequences for the country were momentous.

The German submarine issue again burst into the headlines, on March 24, 1916. An unarmed French passenger ship, the Sussex, was torpedoed by an underseas marauder while crossing the English channel. Although severely damaged, the vessel limped into port with some eighty casualties, including injury to several Americans. The attack was a flagrant violation of the German Arabic pledge not to sink unresisting passenger ships without warning, and America was instantly aroused.

The ensuing crisis was the most dangerous yet to confront the United States. Diplomatically, the Sussex was by far the most important ship of the war. The submarine commander who torpedoed the vessel thought that he had attacked a warship, and his mistaken report to his superiors caused the Foreign Office at first to deny responsibility. This apparent duplicity further angered the American public and official Washington. Secretary Lansing favored an immediate rupture, but Wilson, faced with the Mexican crisis and a divided public opinion, recoiled from extreme measures. The stern note that Secretary Lansing finally sent to Berlin, on April 18, 1916, bluntly asserted:

Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations. . . . 3

The German reply, dated May 4, 1916, yielded to the major American demand. It declared that no more unresisting merchantmen—not just passenger liners—were to be sunk without warning and without proper humanitarian precautions. But a long "string" was tied to this pledge. Berlin assumed that Washington would now demand that the other belligerents respect "the laws of humanity"—that is, force Britain to relax her starvation blockade. Should such a relaxation not occur, Germany "would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve [to] itself complete liberty of decision." 4 Wilson gratefully accepted the no-torpedoing assurances—but refused to accept the "string."

The so-called "Sussex Pledge" was consequently not a pledge at all. Berlin qualified it by insisting on conditions regarding the British blockade that were impossible of fulfillment. Yet Wilson won a deceptive dip-

» Foreign Relations, 1916 Supp., p. 234. •Ibid., pp. 259-260.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.